Abstract. We here consider how victory and defeat are treated in the Chu !n/Chyo !u. We find that the Lu " court of Spring and Autumn times viewed military operations not in a chivalric or moralizing way, like characters in Dzwo " Jwa # n ! ! ! ! (DJ) narratives of Spring and Autumn events, but in a cold-eyed military advantage way.
An officer of We #! in 3/28:1 (0668) and the ruler of Chu " in 8/16:6 (0575). The first of these 2 is the first time that a defeated host was led by someone other than a ruler; this presented the CC scribe with a new situation. The Gu !ngya $ng and Gu "lya $ng commentaries labor over the second instance; they suggest that the reason is that the Chu " ruler was personally wounded.
For the ruler's feelings as part of the court ethos reflected in CC, see Brooks Distancing.
3
A famous instance is the battle of Chv $ng-pu $, for which see Brooks Numbers. 4 See CC 2/13:1, 3/9:5, 6/6:2, 7/2:1, 8/2:2, and 8/16:2. 5 The only ba #!-j! ! that is not the outcome of a ja #n is the Jo !u King's defeat by the Ma $u Ru $ng 6 in 8/1:6 (0590). The CC regularly shows deference to the Jo $u King, and thus is unlikely to have used ba #!-j! ! here in an openly derogatory sense; see further n22 below. Note the implications of "en garde." A stab in the back is not a duelist's victory. Protocol. With two exceptions, the subject of ba # !-j! ! is the defeated host (shr ! ! ! ), 2 not its leader, which in the CC is a ruler or a deputized kinsman or noble. This reluctance to impute defeat to the ruler applies not only to Lu ", but also to Ch! $, Su # ng, We #!, Ye !n, Ch! $n, J! #n, Jv # ng, and Chu ". It presumably reflects a CC convention of respect for rulers as such. This may explain why the ba # !-j! ! statements are always in the 3 passive voice, but it does not help us with the difference between ba # !-j! ! and ba # !.
Severity. Another possibility is that ba #!-j! ! defeats are more severe than ba #! defeats. DJ 3/11:1 explains:
when the enemy is not drawn up in order it says 'defeated the X host,' when both are in order it is a battle (ja # n); a great collapse is called ba # !-j! !." Legge may be influenced by this note in sometimes translating ba #!-j! ! as "suffered a great defeat." Some ba #!-j! ! are followed by a long period where that state undertakes no new military actions. But others are not; 4 some states indeed are militarily active in the same year as their ba # !-j ! ! defeat. 5 Disorder. The disorder motif in the DJ definition is echoed by a Ta
were startled into flight, and lost cohesion." But a fleeing army can recover its morale if it can regroup, or if it is rallied by its leader. What possible use could information about a temporary rout have had at the court of Lu "?
A way out of this definitional impasse is to notice the distribution of ba #! and ba #!-j! !. The simplest statement is that ba #!-j! ! only occurs in a military encounter which is called a ja # n ! ! ! "battle." Then the actual information conveyed by ba # !-j! ! is not that a ba # ! 6 defeat was particularly severe, or that it resulted in loss of cohesion, but simply that it occurred in the course of a "battle." It would follow that mere "ba #!" defeats occurred in encounters that did not qualify as "battles." So we may next ask: What is a battle?
Hypothesis. We note that many participants in ba #! encounters are non-Sinitic states or nonstate peoples like the D! $, who did not possess the Sinitic art of chariot fighting, or may sometimes have fought differently. Between Sinitic states, CC information sometimes implies a non-formal encounter: a skirmish or surprise attack. Here the DJ definition is suggestive. We propose this hypothesis: in a ja # n encounter, two chariot forces are drawn up and engage, and valor, not preparedness, determines the result. The result may be inconclusive (as in 8 ja # n entries). But if it is conclusive, shame attaches to the loser, as it would not if the loser had merely been taken unprepared.
DJ says that the quarrel arose over Lu "'s distribution of rations, and was settled by Lu " 8 appealing to the order established by Jo !u, a typical piece of ritualistic/ceremonial imagining. DJ, Gu !ngya $ng, and Gu "lya $ng differ among themselves as to why this battle was fought.
9 DJ here imagines a Lu "/Ch! $ border dispute for which there is no support in CC. One point 10 of interest in this sequence is that it shows that a weak state (Lu ") could be forced to renounce a covenant (here, one previously made with Ju !) by a strong state (Ch! $).
We now check this hypothesis against the relevant CC data. These comprise the 23 ja #n (including 15 ba #!-j! ! defeats), the one ba #!-j! ! not resulting from a ja #n, plus 16 ba #!, for a total of 40 items. We note that these entries comprise only 8% of CC military events. Spring and Autumn forces largely avoided the set-piece battle, and preferred the unopposed raid or the incidental skirmish: actions perhaps conferring no great military glory upon the leaders, but achieving results that were of interest to the state.
The CC "Ja # n" Battles 2/10:4 (0702). Inconclusive. In summer 0714, Lu " walled La $ng ! ! (116!47" E, 35!1"N) , near a bend in the Sz # River. This gave Lu " a protected outpost near to Su # ng and to Tsa $u ! ! . Tsa $u was also of interest to We # !. In autumn the Lu " ruler went to meet the ruler of We #!, who did not appear; some difficulty between Lu " and We #! had passed beyond diplomatic resolution. At the end of 0702, We # ! with Ch! $ and Jv # ng fought a battle with Lu " at La $ng. Their purpose was thwarted, since Lu " maintained its position at La $ng. In the following month, the allies covenanted at Wu # -tsa $u ! ! ! ! , probably near 8 Tsa $u, and probably to discuss action against Lu ", but no such action occurred.
2/12:9 (0700). Inconclusive. After 0702, the Prince of Lu " had often met with the Lord of Su # ng; they covenanted in the 7th month of 0700. But further meetings followed in the 8th and 11th months, and shortly after the last of them, Lu " covenanted with Jv # ng. In the 12th month, Lu " and Jv # ng invaded Su $ ng, and a battle was fought near the Su # ng capital, without any mentioned outcome, and with no described sequelae. 2/13:1 (0699). Conclusive. In the 2nd month of 0699, larger forces (Lu ", J! # ! ! , and Jv # ng vs Ch! $, Su # ng, We # !, and Ye !n) renewed the fight; in that battle, We # ! and its allies were defeated (ba
. In effect, the indecisive battle of 0700 was taken up with new allies in 0699 and fought to a finish. The issue seems to have been an increased Lu " presence in the Su # ng and We # ! sphere of interest. Neither state could put together a 9 combination that would force Lu " to retreat from its advanced position at La $ng.
2/17:3 (0695). Inconclusive. In the 1st month, Lu " had made a covenant with Ch! $ and J! # ! ! at Hwa $ng ! ! , a place nearer to Ch! $ and J! # than to Lu "; Lu " was thus probably the constrained party. In the 2nd month, Lu " covenanted with small nearby Ju ! ! ! , perhaps as a counter to the Ch! $ covenant. In the 5th month, Lu " fought a battle with Ch! $ in Lu "; the Ch! $ incursion was probably a reprisal for the Ju ! covenant. In the 8th month, with forces from Su # ng and We # !, Lu " made an unopposed incursion into Ju !, presumably in repudiation of its covenant with Ju !. In the 1st month of 0694, the Prince of Lu " covenanted with Ch! $, and later went to Ch! $ with his wife, a member of the Ch! $ ruling house. The Ch! $/Lu " battle seems to have been a demonstration. Though militarily a standoff, it had made its point: Lu " renounced Ju !, and instead adhered to Ch! $. This is the meaning of the special term ! ! ! ! ; see Brooks League.
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DJ describes a Ch! $ force led by the Lord of Ch! $; this conflicts with the CC record.
12
On this blank canvas, DJ spins a tremendous tale of depravity and aggrieved loyalty. 13 3/9:5 (0685). Conclusive. Lu " had made cause with a Ch! $ faction in spring. That summer, Lu " invaded Ch! $, explicitly in support of Prince Jyo # u ! ! as a candidate to succeed the deceased Ch! $ Sya !ng-gu !ng. In the 8th month, Lu " fought a battle with a Ch! ! force and was defeated (ba
. The long time spent by Lu " in Ch! $ presumably allowed a superior force to be assembled against it. Next month, in a separate action, Ch! $ captured and killed Prince Jyo # u. This Lu " attempt at internal interference, which is understandable in view of previous Ch! $ behavior toward Lu ", led to a long period of enmity between Lu " and the successful Ch! $ candidate, the famous Ch! $ Hwa $n-gu !ng.
3/28:1 (0666). Conclusive. In the summer of 0667, Lu " had covenanted with Ch! $, Su # ng, Chv $ n, and Jv # ng, though not with We #!, in the interest of common security against the pressure of Chu ". At the end of 0667, the Prince of Lu " had met with the Lord of 11 Ch! $ in Chv $ ng-pu $ , in the territory of We #!; again, We #! was not present. In the 3rd month of 0666, A Ch! $ officer led a force, invaded We #!, and fought a battle with a We #! force, which was defeated (ba
The attack probably had the prior consent of Lu ". 12 5/15:12 (0645). Defeat implied. Ch! $n and J! #n battled at Ha $n, and Ch! $n captured the Lord of J! #n, implying a damaging defeat. The general term ba # !-j! ! seems to be replaced in this entry by specifics which sufficiently indicate who had lost. 13 5/18:3 (0642). Conclusive. Ch! $ Hwa $n-gu !ng died at the end of 0643. In the next month, a joint force from Su # ng, Tsa $u, We # !, and Ju ! attacked Ch! $, hoping to influence the resulting succession dispute. That summer, a Lu " force went to relieve Ch! $, with no stated result but perhaps reducing the number of intruders in Ch! $. In the 5th month, the Su # ng contingent of the previous joint force (still in Ch! $ territory after four months) fought a pitched battle with a Ch! $ force and was defeated (ba
; the D! $ people also came to the aid of Ch! $. Time had apparently redressed the disparity of numbers, and mitigated the previous confusion. In the 8th month, Ch! $ Hwa $n-gu !ng was finally buried. As in 3/9:5, we see the neighbor states attempting to intervene in Ch! $ politics at a time of presumptive Ch! $ military weakness (in theory, only the ruler could lead the forces of the state; with the succession disputed, the forces might accordingly be hampered).
5/22:3 (0638).
Inconclusive. In autumn 0639, the rulers of Su # ng, Chu ", Chv $ n, Tsa #!, Jv # ng, and several other states (but not including Lu ") had met to make a covenant. At the meeting, the others had seized the ruler of Su # ng and forthwith invaded Su # ng. That winter, pursuing a parallel interest of its own, Lu " invaded small nearby Ju !, without any stated result. At the same time, an envoy from Chu " came to present to Lu " some of the spoils of the Su # ng invasion; Lu " at this time was sympathetic to Chu "'s attempt to expand its influence into the north. In the 12th month, the Prince of Lu " met with Chu " and its allies. At that meeting, the ruler of Su # ng was released from captivity, perhaps at the suggestion of Lu ". In the 3rd month of 0638, Lu " again invaded Ju !, and this time took its territory Syw ! -jyw # ! ! ! ! . In summer, the rulers of Su # ng, We #!, Syw " ! ! , and Tv $ ng had attacked Jv # ng.
DJ invents a ba #!-j! ! defeat for Lu ", and then invents a cautionary tale of neglected advice 14 to explain the defeat. Listening to advice, according to DJ, is the fundamental virtue of a ruler.
DJ again explains this defeat as the Su #ng ruler's failure to listen to advice. As always, DJ 15 is unaware of the grand strategical aspect of the text on which it is commenting. See Brooks Numbers. This famous battle may have led commentators to regard all ba #!-j ! ! 16 as routs or disabling defeats; other CC entries show the reality to be more nuanced. It is here that DJ sees an idealized "hegemon" system as being inaugurated; compare Brooks Hegemon.
Not taking part in these events, but perhaps profiting from the distraction of many nearby states, Lu " in the 8th month moved into Ju ! territory. This time a Ju ! force opposed Lu ", and a battle was fought in Shv !ng-sy! #ng ! ! ! ! , near Ju !. No details are given, but later CC entries do not suggest success. It seems that a Lu " attempt to take 14 territory from Ju ! was met by a force sufficient to thwart it: a successful blocking action. No very large force can have been fielded by Ju !, and probably the Lu " invading force was also modest. This would then qualify as a "battle" not by its size, but because this time the Ju ! force was drawn up and ready to resist. 5/22:4 (0638). Conclusive. As the conclusion of the series of events affecting Su # ng, in the 11th month Su # ng fought a battle with Chu " and was defeated (ba
Su # ng being thus weakened, Ch! $ invaded Su # ng in spring 0637, and besieged M! $n ! ! .
5/28:5 (0632).
Conclusive. Ch! $ had twice invaded Lu " territory in 0634. In response, a We # ! force had entered Ch! $. A Lu " envoy had gone to Chu " to ask military assistance. That winter, Chu " invaded Su # ng and besieged M! $n, the city Ch! $ had attacked in 0637. Evidently with the aid of that force, Lu " invaded Ch! $ and took Gu " ! ! . In the winter of 0633, a joint force from Chu ", Chv $ n, Tsa # !, Jv # ng, and Syw " ! ! besieged Su # ng. Lu " had met with the besieging forces in the 12th month, when they made a covenant in Su # ng. Now come the tremendous events of 0632. In spring, J! #n invaded Tsa $u and We #!. Ma "!, a son of Lu " Jwa !ng-gung and an uncle of Sy! !-gung, had been remiss in protecting We #! from invasion; Lu " put him to death. A Chu " force had gone to the relief of We # !. In the 3rd month, J! #n invaded Tsa $u, seized its ruler, and handed him over to Su # ng. Then in the 4th month, with contingents from Ch! $, Su # ng, and Ch! $n, J! #n fought a battle with Chu " at Chv $ ng-pu $ ; Chu " was defeated (ba
; Chu " killed its high officer Dv $ -chv $ n, who had led the defeated Chu " force. His error, like that of Lu " in 0685, was seemingly to remain so long in enemy territory that a superior force could be assembled to oppose him. The Chu " defeat was a rout. It so weakened Chu " that for eight years Chu " made no further military effort, and then only to attack Jya !ng ! ! , a small and nearby state. 16 6/2:1 (0625). Unknown. In the second month, J! #n and Ch! $n battled in Pv $ ng-ya $;
There is no other CC information that would permit us to form a more precise impression of this encounter. See next. 6/7:6 (0620). Unknown. A battle was fought between Ch! $n and J! #n. No outcome is stated by the CC. As with other matters relating to Ch! $n, the most distant of the states mentioned in CC, the Lu " chronicler in this case may have lacked information. 6/12:7 (0615). Unknown. Another battle of unspecified outcome between Ch! $n and J! #n. A few months earlier, Ch! $n had sent a friendly mission to Lu ", probably to dissuade it from giving assistance to J! #n, as Lu " would do on a later occasion (8/12:1f).
DJ explains the defeat as due to wrangling and betrayal among the Su #ng leaders; that is, 17 to propriety violation. Propriety, whether in the abstract or as embodied in the advice of wise ministers, is ultimately the DJ's one mode of historical explanation. DJ explains this defeat by saying that J! #n had ignored wise advice: a warning that Chu " was 18 practicing virtuous government and was thus invulnerable: This kind of populist wishful thinking was also indulged by Mencius, whose career coincided with the late layer of the DJ. Compare n9 above.
19
This is the only ba #!-j! ! entry in which the agent of the passive voice is expressed.
20
Reversing its earlier analysis, DJ explains the defeat of Chu " by its violation of every canon 21 of populist government. Theory is triumphant, if behavior is perhaps a little inconsistent.
7/2:1 (0607). Conclusive. In spring, forces of Su # ng and Jv # ng met in battle; Su # ng was defeated (ba
and Hwa # Ywae $ n, the Su # ng leader, was taken prisoner. A Ch! $n 17 force invaded J! #n, and that summer joined with Su # ng, We # !, and Chv $ n to invade Jv # ng, perhaps to gain the release of Hwa # Ywae $ n. Here, in contrast to 5/15:12 above, we have both a statement of defeat and information about the capture of the defeated leader.
7/12:3 (0597). Conclusive. In spring, Chu " besieged Jv # ng; in the 6th month, a relieving J! #n force battled with Chu ", and was defeated (ba
power vacuum that Chu " in the 12th month extinguished Sya !u ! ! , near to Su # ng.
8/1:6 (0590). Anomalous. In autumn, the Royal host (
These Ru $ ng presumably fought in a non-Sinitic way, hence the absence of ja # # # # n. It remains to ask why the defeat is stated with the passive ba #!-j! ! rather than the active ba #!. Perhaps the latter option would make the Royal force the object of the verb, and the subject position in the sentence may have been thought 19 by the respectful scribe to be the less undignified of the choices available to him. 20 8/2:2 (0589). Conclusive. In the summer of 0590, Lu " had covenanted with J! #n. In spring 0589, Ch! $ invaded Lu "'s northern border. As though in retaliation, that summer We # ! fought a battle with Ch! $ in Ch! $ territory; We # ! was defeated (ba
8/2:3 (0589). Conclusive. Later that summer, several kinsmen of the Lu " ruler led a force, and with forces from J! #n, We # !, and Tsa $u battled Ch! $, again in Ch! $ territory; this time Ch 
. That autumn, Lu " took lands near the Wv # n River, which ran between Ch! $ and Lu ". J! #n at this period was the policeman of the north; its policy was to coordinate northern forces against incursions from Chu ", and to keep the northern states themselves in balance, lest any become strong enough to challenge J! #n. J! #n is here maintaining a balance of power between strong Ch! $ and weaker Lu ". 8/16:6 (0575). Conclusive. In the 6th month, J! #n sought military aid from Lu "; none was sent. Without help from Lu ", J! #n battled a Jv # ng and Chu " allied force at Ye !n-l! $ng, and the joint force was defeated (ba
. Chu " later killed its high officer, Prince 21 Tsv # , presumably for his responsibility for the Chu " defeat (compare 5/28:5). The Lu " Prince later sought to join the peace negotiations between J! #n, We # !, Su # ng, and Chu ", but was refused admittance. Lu " sought to redeem itself by joining J! #n, Ch! $, and Ju ! in attacking Chu "'s ally Jv # ng. A shakeup in Lu " followed, some of the Prince's kinsmen being seized by J! #n or fleeing to Ch! $. In the 12th month, Lu " covenanted with J! #n. On his return from the covenant, the Lu " Prince executed his half-brother Ye "n.
Thus was Lee deflected from his nimble Pennsylvania raid into a losing set-piece battle 22 with Meade at Gettysburg. Battle can redefine a campaign which had been otherwise conceived.
We here get a glimpse of factions in a small state, favoring one or another larger power. The larger powers were evidently well informed about these polarities.
10/17:6 (0525). Unknown. A Chu " force did battle with Wu $ at Cha $ng-a # n ! ! ! ! . This is far into Chu " territory, and that penetration alone counts as a considerable Wu $ achievement. Distance may have been a factor in the lack of further CC information. Later CC entries implicitly credit Chu " with a successful blocking action. 11/4:14 (0506). Conclusive. In the 3rd month, J! #n, Su # ng, Tsa # !, We # !, Chv $ n, Jv # ng, Ch! $, and several smaller states had met and then invaded Chu ". In the 4th month, the ruler of Tsa # ! had extinguished Shv "n ! ! , taken its ruler back with him, and killed him. In the 5th month, the previous allies had made a covenant. Not deterred, Chu " besieged Tsa #! in the 7th month. Wu $ , already a major enemy of Chu ", joined Tsa #! in a battle with Chu ", and Chu " was defeated (ba !) . Rather than face the inevitable, Na $ng Wa " of Chu " fled to Jv # ng. Wu $ evidently continued to press the defeated Chu " forces, and presently entered Y! "ng, the capital of Chu ". By this additional information, not by the term ba #!-j! ! (compare 7/12:3), we may infer that the defeat of Chu " was a serious one. 12/2:5 (0490). Conclusive. In summer, Ja # u Ya !ng led a J! #n force in battle with Jv # ng; the Jv # ng force was defeated (ba
There is no other CC information that would permit us to form a more precise impression of this encounter. 12/11:3 (0484). Conclusive. In spring, Gwo $ Shu ! had led a Ch! $ force and invaded Lu ". In the 5th month, in retaliation, Lu " and Wu $ joined in invading Ch! $. Gwo $ Shu !, again commanding the Ch! $ force, sought to attack the invaders separately, and fought a battle with Wu $ ; he was defeated (ba
and captured. Again we have both the fact of the defeat and the fact of the capture (see 7/2:1). There was a meeting between Lu " and Wu $ in the following autumn, 0483, but nothing came of it (compare 2/10:4).
The battles above surveyed, whether or not with a stated ba
! outcome, are final in the sense that whatever might have been the original goal, neither force undertakes further action immediately after the battle (the only exception is 2/17:3, which was probably fought to make a statement rather than to secure a victory in the usual sense). For both leaders, the opposing force was, or had become, the "objective point."
22
How were these encounters viewed by the respective courts? Was the Ju ! force in 5/22:3 told to smash the Lu " army and faulted for its failure? Was it told to hold the position and praised for its success? We suggest the latter. In May 1942, a Japanese naval force moved to attack Port Moresby in New Guinea; an Australian/American force opposed. The latter lost the more valuable shipping; both withdrew afterward. Was Japan the victor because its losses were less? Was the battle drawn because neither side remained in possession of the field? Informed opinion sees a strategic victory for the allied opposing force, because Japan's invasion attempt was thwarted.
The CC in 5/22:3, and in several other instances seemingly of the same type, does not say "successful blocking action." Perhaps it had no terms with which to do so, and relied on its informed readership, the Prince and court of Lu ", to supply that inference.
DJ here agrees in imagining a Lu " attack on an unprepared Su #ng force.
23
DJ here tells the famous story of Tsa #u Gwe #!, a commoner who on being assured of the Lu "
24
Prince's assiduousness in meting out justice, symbolically joins him in his chariot and guides him to victory over Ch! $. This is merely more DJ populism, a special version of DJ moralism.
To its credit (and following its own theory), DJ also visualizes the encounter this way.
25
DJ complicates this scenario with a propriety-violation subplot of insult and revenge.
26
Non-Ja # n Military Encounters
We next survey the other group of military encounters which are identified by CC as ending in defeat (ba # !) for one side or the other, to see if our suggestion of ja # n as a formal, prepared battle will hold for these events as well. 1/10:3 (0713). Incident of invasion. In the 1st month, the Lu " Prince had made an agreement with the rulers of Ch! $ and Jv # ng at Ju !ng-chyo !u ! ! ! ! . That summer, Hwe # ! (a brother of the Lu " Prince; back in 0719 he had led a Lu " force which together with Su # ng, Chv $ n, and Tsa # ! forces had invaded Jv # ng) led a force which with Ch! $ and Jv # ng forces invaded Su # ng. No outcome is specified. In the 6th month, some weeks later, the Lu " Prince, apparently in charge of a Lu " force acting on its own, defeated a Su # ng force at Gwa !n ! ! , and quickly went on to take (chyw " ! ! ) Ga # u ! ! and then Fa $ng ! ! . These places are not far inside Su # ng, in the area for which the town of La $ng ! ! , which had been fortified in the previous year (2/10:4, above) was the strongpoint. One imagines that the Lu " force brushed aside a scratch Su # ng blocking attempt, and proceeded, 23 unopposed, to take several Su # ng towns. Su # ng was not much weakened: that autumn, a presumably organized joint force from Su # ng and We #! entered Jv # ng, and with a force from Tsa # !, attacked Da # !. The ruler of Jv # ng attacked the allies and took Da # !. None of this shows the organized Su # ng force as very effective; one also gets the impression that the Lu " ruler was a better commander than his brother. But this is not the point at issue.
In this first non-ja #n encounter, it is conspicuous that the invading force defeated an enemy and then continued with what was evidently its intended goal. The aim of the campaign was not to bring on a battle with Su # ng, but to take two towns from Su # ng.
3/10:1 (0684). Resisted incursion. In spring the Lu " Prince defeated a Ch! $ force at an uncertain location in Lu ", presumably resisting an incursion. Next month, the Lu "
24
Prince made an incursion into Su # ng. A month later, Su # ng relocated a town which may have been too far from the Su # ng capital to be defended successfully against Lu ". 3/10:4 (0684). Resisted incursion. In the 6th month, forces of Ch! $ and Su # ng camped at La $ng; and the Lu " Prince defeated the Su # ng force at Shv # ng-chyo !u ! ! ! ! , north of La $ng. Lu " seems to have attacked the Su # ng contingent separately, weakening the joint force and eliminating the threat to La $ng; it was this maneuver which Gwo $ Shu ! tried and failed to execute in 12/11:3. If the attack was a surprise one, then the lack 25 of ja # # # # n need not puzzle us: there was no "battle," rather, a less formal encounter.
3/10:5 (0684). Successful incursion. In the 9th month, J! !ng ! ! (later "Chu " ! ! ") defeated the Tsa # ! host at Sy! !n ! ! and carried off the Lord of Tsa # !. We may suppose that here Chu " overcame (ba # !) any Tsa # ! resistance, and went on with its decapitation 26 strike against Tsa # !.
